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Part 1 - The Reform of Joint Regulation and Labour Market Policy  
 
1.1 Introduction 
In their seminal book on the models of eastern European capitalism, Bohle and Greskovits 
(2012) argue that Romania has a special type of neo-liberal society with weak state 
institutions, high centralisation and coverage of collective bargaining and relatively high 
mobilisation power of trade unions. Before the 2008 crisis, Romania had a comprehensive 
system of industrial relations with widespread collective bargaining at national, sectoral and 
establishment levels; the legal system supported the development of bi-partite and tripartite 
consultation and negotiation between trade unions, employers and the Government (Trif, 
2010). However, this system was radically altered by the Government after the crisis, despite 
opposition from trade unions and the largest employers’ associations (Ciutacu, 2012). The 
legal changes led to the implosion of trade unions’ fundamental rights to bargain collectively, 
to form trade unions and to take industrial action. As a result, cross-sectoral collective 
agreements ceased to exist and very few multi-employer collective agreements were 
concluded after the new labour law was adopted in 2011. The crisis was used as a pretext by 
the centre-right government to reform the industrial relations system, with the support of the 
Troika of the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
European Central Bank (ECB).  
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1.2 Collective bargaining before the 2008 crisis 
Romania had relatively protectionist labour legislation with high centralisation and coverage 
of collective bargaining before 2008 (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012; Trif, 2008). The 
Romanian legal system has a strong French influence, being broadly based on the Napoleonic 
Code.Post-1989 legislation entitled the social partners to bargain collectively and gave unions 
the right to strike (Hayter et al., 2013). Collective agreements could be concluded at national, 
industry (or other sub-divisions) and company levels. Comparable only to Slovenia amongst 
the new EU Member States, there was an automatic extension of collective agreements to 
cover all employees in the bargaining unit. In Romania, all employees were covered by 
across-sectoral national agreement before the 2008 crisis. Additionally, employees were 
covered at industry level by collective agreements in 20 out of the 32 branches eligible for 
collective bargaining. Collective agreements existed in the main manufacturing sectors, 
namely the extractive industry, metal sector, white goods sector, automobile sector, food 
industry, textile industry and wood industry (Preda, 2006: 13). Collective agreements 
concluded at national and sectoral levels set the minimum terms and conditions of 
employment. Thus, they were used as minimum standards for the negotiation of collective 
agreements at company level in unionised companies. Nevertheless, it was difficult to enforce 
the provisions of collective agreements (and the statutory labour legislation), particularly for 
the lowest paid employees (Trif, 2008). 
Romanian law requires employers to initiate collective bargaining annually within any 
company with more than 20 employees (Hayter et al., 2013). In large unionised companies, 
wages, social benefits, holidays and working conditions are generally negotiated between 
trade unions, employers and sometimes the State (Trif, 2008). In most non-unionised 
companies, employers unilaterally imposed terms and conditions. In contrast to Slovenia and 
Slovakia, in Romania the company was the most important level for the establishment of the 
terms and conditions of employment even before the crisis (Carley et al., 2007).  
The EU accession process led to legislative change that affected collective bargaining. In 
order to harmonise Labour Code provisions with the EU social acquis, the restrictions on 
concluding individual fixed-term employment contracts were relaxed in countries that had 
relatively protectionist labour legislation, such as Romania and Slovenia (Carley et al., 2007). 
Yet, when the Council of Foreign Investors tried to remove the legal obligation on employers 
to bargain with trade unions or employee representatives during the 2005 Labour Code 
revision, Romanian trade union officials managed to preserve the collective bargaining 
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mechanism with the support of the European Trade Union Congress and the International 
Labour Organization (Trif, 2008).  
Although the formal Romanian labour market regulation before 2008 was considered 
protectionist, particularly by foreign investors, in practice, the issues with the enforcement of 
the labour legislation and collective agreements made it rather flexible (Bohle and 
Greskovits, 2012). Furthermore, low wages were one of the key factors that led to massive 
labour migration before (and after) the crisis and low labour force participation (Stoiciu, 
2012; Trif, 2014). Thus, labour market regulations were not perceived as hindering the 
competitiveness of Romania. Furthermore, labour market regulations could have been used to 
address labour market issues of massive immigration and low labour force participation 
(Stoiciu, 2012; Trif, 2013). 
 
Trade unions before the 2008 crisis 
After 1989, the organisation and functioning of trade unions were regulated primarily by the 
Constitution, the Labour Code and the Law on Trade Unions. The law allowed a minimum of 
15 employees to form a union. Two unions from the same industry can form a union federation 
if their combined membership numbers are at least 60, and two federations can form a 
confederation. This legal framework contributed to the development of a decentralised and 
fragmented trade union movement.  
The fragmentation of trade unions is common in Eastern Europe, particularly due to the division 
between the old reformed unions and newly established organisations. In Romania however, the 
reformed and the largest new union organisations merged in 1993 to create the largest 
confederation: the National Free Trade Union Confederation of Romania – Fratia (CNSRL-
Fratia). There are four additional nationally representative union confederations in 
Romania:the National Trade Union Block (BNS); the National Democratic Trade Union 
Confederation of Romania (created in 1994 as result of a split from the CNSRL- Fratia); the 
National Trade Union Confederation Cartel Alfa; and the Meridian. Despite a widely publicised 
proposed merger of four out of these five confederations in February 2007, CNSRL- Fratia, 
BNS and Meridian only formed a loose alliance and maintained their independent status. Similar 
to all the Eastern European countries, the reformed union remained the strongest organisation 
after 1990. Most Romanian union confederations (except Meridian) are members of the 
European Trade Union Confederation. 
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The transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy has been a very 
difficult period for trade unions. They had to protect workers’ interests during transition but 
also support the move towards a more efficient economic system that would (hopefully) 
improve working conditions in the long term. By and large, Romanian unions did not obstruct 
the transformation process, although restructuring led to massive decline in their 
membership. However, unlike the Polish Solidarity union they did not support shock therapy 
reform. Trade union density in Romania fell from 90 percent at the beginning of the 1990s to 
around 35 percent in 2006 but was still twice as high as in Poland (Trif, 2008). Romanian and 
Slovenian trade unions were amongst the strongest in Eastern Europe in terms of union 
density and influence over labour legislation before the crisis (Carley et al., 2007). 
The manufacturing sector had the highest trade union density in Romania, although unions 
were quite fragmented. In 2002, trade union density in heavy industry was over 75 percent, 
whilst in the food and textile sectors it was around 50 percent (Preda, 2006: 13-15). The 
highest union density was in the metal industry (83 percent). There were ten union 
federations operating in the metal sector, out of which five were representative at the sectoral 
level (Preda, 2006: 44). In the chemical sector, there were five union federations having 76 
percent union density in 2002. Eight union federations operated in the textile industry and 
four in the food, beverage and tobacco sector. Nevertheless, in each manufacturing branch the 
representative unions cooperated regularly to negotiate collective agreements, which covered 
all employees in the sector before the crisis. 
 
Employers’ associations before the crisis 
In most new EU Member States, employers’ associations had a limited role in the 
development of industrial relations after 1989 compared to trade unions. The lack of 
experience and the slow pace of privatisation were the main factors leading to very weak 
consolidation amongst Romanian employers’ associations. Additionally, foreign investors 
were not willing to join employers’ associations. They preferred to join a trade association 
called the Council of Foreign Investors (Chivu, 2005). 
The fragmentation of employers’ associations is common in the new Member States (Kohl 
and Platzer, 2004) but Romanian associations are amongst the most divided in the region. 
The number of nationally representative employers’ associations increased from five prior to 
2001 to 13 by 2008. A first attempt to merge the five largest confederations was made in 
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December 1995 with support from the International Organization of Employers. An 
agreement to form Patronatul Roman was signed but conflict between the divergent interests 
of private and state-owned enterprises led to separation in 1996. In 1999, there was a second 
attempt to unify employers’ organizations in an Employers’ Confederation of Romania but 
this disbanded in 2003. 
In 2004, the two largest member organisations of the former Employers’ Confederation of 
Romania, together with four other employers’ associations established an umbrella organisation, 
the Alliance of Employers’ Confederations of Romania, covering primarily large domestically 
owned companies. By May 2006, seven employers’ confederations were members of this 
organisation, with four others announcing their intention to create a new alliance (Chivu, 2007). 
The Alliance of Employers’ Confederations of Romania was established primarily to represent 
members’ interests at the international level, particularly in EU institutions. Moreover, the 
merger of these fragmented associations was a pre-condition for membership of the European 
employers’ confederation, Business Europe. Employers started to combine their strength at the 
national level but there were still 13 nationally representative employers’ associations in 2008, 
as the members of the umbrella organisations retained their representative status. In 2007, all 
13 employers’ associations signed the last cross-sectoral collective agreement valid from 
2007 to 2010.   
Also, sectoral employers’ associations remained fragmented. Before the crisis, there were 15 
employers’ associations in the food, beverage and tobacco sector, six employers’ associations 
in the chemical sector and two in the metal industry (Preda, 2006). Similar to union 
federations, the employers’ federations in the manufacturing sectors managed to cooperate 
during the process of negotiating sectoral collective agreements.  
 
1.3 The crisis and social partners’ responses to it 
Socio-economic developments since the crisis 
The international financial crisis severely affected the economic and social developments in 
Romania after 2008. There was a reduction in the gross domestic product (GDP) of 6.6 
percent in 2009, followed by a further reduction of 1.6 percent in 2010, indicating a more 
severe economic downturn than in Bulgaria, which had a similar level of economic growth 
before the crisis, and the EU average (Eurostat, 2014). The construction sector was the worst 
affected, dropping 14 percent in the value it added to GDP in 2009, followed by agriculture   
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(-7.8 percent) and services (-5.9 percent) (Zaman and Georgescu, 2009:618). After 2008, the 
average wage increases were below the level of inflation (Trif, 2013). Also, wage earnings in 
Romania are amongst the lowest in EU Member States (Hayter et al., 2013), which indicates 
the trade unions did not manage to safeguard employees’ purchasing power. 
Nevertheless, Romania has one of the lowest unemployment rates in the EU. Although the 
crisis led to massive layoffs in the manufacturing, construction, retail and the public sector 
(Stoiciu, 2012:2), the unemployment level has increased by less than 2 percent since 2008 to 
a maximum of 7.5 percent in 2013 (Eurostat, 2014). Whilst the Government took certain 
measures to encourage employment, such as exempting companies from paying tax on 
reinvested profit and social security contributions for six months if they hired unemployed 
people (Stoiciu, 2012: 2), it appears that the main reason for the low unemployment rate is 
the fact that Romanian workers used individual ‘exit’ either into the informal economy or by 
emigrating abroad (Stan and Erne, 2014). The size of the informal economy increased from 
around 22 percent in 2007 to 29 percent in 2012 (European Commission, 2013: 5). 
Eurobarometer data from 2007 indicates that the main reason to work in the informal 
economy is the low salaries in regular businesses. This data also shows that only 27 percent 
of the Romanian population trusts trade unions, which suggests that the majority of workers 
do not believe that unions can improve their working conditions. 
Although reliable statistics about emigration since 2008 are not available, trade union 
officials suggested that the reduction of wages in the public sector in 2009 and 2010 led to an 
increase in the emigration of public sector employees. A senior official interviewed in 2013 
indicated that around 2700 doctors emigrated annually in recent years and their number 
increased by 400 in 2011, after the implementation of the austerity measures. The total 
number of Romanian emigrants from 1990 to 2012 is 2.4 million (Institutul National de 
Statistica, 2014: 9). Unlike in the other EU countries severely affected by the crisis, such as 
Greece and Spain, unemployment and labour market regulation have not been a major issue 
during the crisis or considered a cause of the crisis in Romania. 
There are three sets of interrelated causes of the economic downturn in Romania. First, 
despite the limited proportion of toxic assets in its banking system, Romania has been 
exposed to the adverse effects of the global financial crisis primarily due to its openness to 
foreign capital (Ban, 2014). For instance, foreign stakeholders account for over 85 percent of 
the total banking assets (Trif, 2013). The second set of factors refers to a reduction of the 
external and internal demand for goods and services. Romanian exports to the EU shrank by 
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25 percent in 2009 (Trif, 2013). The manufacturing sector was amongst the first affected by 
the crisis, having a 7.7 percent contraction in the last quarter of 2008, due to a decline in 
domestic and external demand (Constantin et al., 2011: 7). The reduction of wages for many 
workers, coupled with the decline of the remittances from abroad, reduced private 
consumption by 9.2 percent (Constantin et al., 2011). The third set of factors refers to the 
economic weaknesses and imbalances that existed before 2008 (Ban, 2014). The economic 
growth before 2008 was primarily based on the consumption of imported goods and real-
estate sales. In spite of economic growth between 2000 and 2008 (approximately 6 percent 
per annum on average), the budget deficit continuously increased, reaching 9 percent of GDP 
in 2009 (Stoiciu, 2012:2).  
In order to deal with the budget deficit, Romania borrowed 20 billion euro from the Troika in 
2010. Additionally, Romania signed a Precautionary Agreement with the IMF in 2011. The 
conditions set by the two international agreements for financial assistance had a great 
influence on the way in which Romanian governments responded to the crisis (Hayter et al., 
2013; Trif, 2013).  
 
Government response to crisis: austerity measures& structural reforms 
A combination of international pressures from the Troika, the ideology of the centre-right 
coalition and lobbying by foreign investors led to two main sets of government responses to 
the 2008 crisis, namely (a) austerity measures seeking to reduce public debt; and (b) 
structural reforms seeking to address the macro-economic imbalances through structural 
reforms (Ban, 2014; Stoiciu, 2012). From 2009, the Government started to introduce fiscal 
consolidation measures, seeking to reduce the budgetary deficit by reducing the wage bill for 
public sector employees, cutting pensions and by limiting welfare benefits (Stoiciu, 2012; 
Ministry of Public Finance, 2014).  In 2009, a new public wage law was introduced by the 
Government (as part of their negotiations with the Troika) which reduced public salaries 
funds (Hayter et al., 2013). Apart from changing the salary grids by tying all public sector 
employees to a wage scale defined in terms multiples of a base salary of 700 RON (€165), the 
provisions of the new law obliged the management of public institutions to reduce personnel 
expenses by 15 percent in 2009. This forced employees to take ten days of unpaid leave. In 
addition, pensioners were forbidden to get additional income on top of their pensions by 
working in paid employment.  
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In 2010, the centre-right coalition introduced one of the most restrictive austerity measures in 
the EU, by decreasing salaries of the public sector employees by 25 percent, reducing 
numerous social benefits by 15 percent and increasing VAT from 19 percent to 25 percent in 
2010 (Trif, 2010). These measures (which were part of the conditions of the Troika financial 
assistance) reduced the budget deficit from 9 percent of GDP in 2009 to 3 percent of GDP in 
2012 (Eurostat, 2014).  They helped the Government to achieve financial consolidation, but 
the budget savings were made at the expense of living standards (Hayter et al., 2013). 
Since 2011, Romanian governments focused on structural reforms, such as restructuring the 
public sector (i.e. cutting jobs, privatisation of public hospitals and other public companies) 
and the flexibilisation of  the labour market and industrial relations institutions(Ban, 2014; 
Ministry of Public Finance, 2014). Labour market reforms were considered important to 
address issues of low labour force participation and migration (Romania has one of the lowest 
labour force participations in the EU and around a third of the active labour force immigrated 
since 1990s) (Stoiciu, 2012). Although labour market rigidities have not been considered a 
cause of the recession in Romania (Ban, 2014), the Troika pushed for a radical 
decentralisation of collective bargaining and more restrictive criteria for the extension of 
collective bargaining (Schulten and Muller, 2013, p. 6). In 2011, the centre-right government 
took the opportunity to dismantle the existent collective bargaining institutions and reduce 
trade unions’ role and influence through legal changes (see Appendix). It did so by 
unilaterally introducing a new Social Dialogue Act (SDA), which abolished all the previous 
laws governing the collective rights of employees (Trif, 2013; see further discussion of the 
effects of SDA in section 4).  
The Government also adopted a New Labour Code in 2011, which primarily affected 
individual employee rights (Stoiciu, 2012). First, the probation period was extended from 30 
to 90 days for workers and from 90 to 120 days for managers (Clauwaert and Schömann, 
2013). Second, it made it easier for employers to use non-standard employment contracts, by 
extending the maximum length of fixed-term employment contracts from 24 to 36 months 
and by making it easier for employers to utilise temporary agency workers. Also, employers 
are allowed to unilaterally reduce the working week (and the corresponding wages) from five 
to four days. Furthermore, it made it possible for employers to grant free days in advance and 
demand employees to work overtime (Clauwaert and Schömann, 2013). The period of time 
off as compensation for overtime has increased from three to four months. Finally, it reduced 
the dismissal protection, particularly by diminishing the protection for union leaders. The 
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new provisions of the Labour Code make it easier for employers to hire and fire employees 
and to utilise flexible forms of employment contracts.   
The austerity measures and the arbitrary way of pushing the reforms through without social 
dialogue led to a substantial decline in the popularity of the centre-right coalition in power 
between 2008 and 2012 (Daborowski, 2012). Although the Government increased wages for 
the public sector employees by 15 percent in January 2011, the controversial privatisation of 
companies that extract natural resources and the attempt to privatise the healthcare system led 
to growing social resistance and contributed to the collapse of the Government in February 
2012. A new government was put in place by the centre-right political coalition, but it 
collapsed after less than three months.  
In May 2012, a new centre-left coalition came to power. The centre-left government decided 
to take measures to enhance its social support, such as increasing salaries in the public sector 
by eight percent from June 2012and by 7 percent from December 2012 to restore public 
sector base salaries to the 2008 level (Trif, 2013). However, wage increases were not 
negotiated with the unions. Furthermore, the centre-left government has neither reversed the 
legal changes made by the previous government, nor restored the other benefits (i.e. meal and 
holiday vouchers) and pay cuts for the public sector employees (i.e. 13
th
 month salary) until 
2014 (Ministry of Finance, 2014). The Government also does not pay the overtime worked by 
public sector employees, despite the fact that some of them have to work overtime. For 
instance, the embargo on public sector employment and massive emigration of medical staff 
led to staff shortages, which in turn required nurses and doctors to work overtime in public 
hospitals to ensure the safety of patients (Trif, 2013).  Furthermore, all the main changes in 
the labour laws since 2008 have been introduced unilaterally by the centre-right and centre–
left governments through emergency ordinances (without public or parliamentary debate), 
which indicates a return to authoritarian decision-making practices. 
 
Unions’ responses to the crisis: militancy against austerity measures 
Trade unions militated against the austerity measures in 2009 and 2010 but they did not 
manage to resist the centre-right government’s attack on employees’ rights and worsening of 
employment conditions for public sector employees. Although the five union confederations 
consulted with the Government with regard to the public sector pay reform, unions were 
dissatisfied with its provisions. They organised local meetings, marches and a one day 
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national strike of public transportation employees in May 2009 against salary cuts, layoffs 
and compulsory unpaid leave. Also, unions picketed two thirds of the county prefectures in 
June 2009 and threatened a general strike to force the Government to consider their proposed 
principles for the public wage law. These included a reduction of the existing ratio of 1:70 
between the highest paid to the lowest paid to 1:15, by freezing wages for five years for the 
high earners and accelerating increases for the lowest paid employees (Ciutacu, 2010). 
Despite talks between government representatives and unions in June 2009 and further mass 
protests and picketing of the Parliament in September 2009, the labour strife had no tangible 
result for employees.  
Furthermore, the reform of the public sector pay aggravated the divisions between unions’ 
confederations and federations. The sectoral unions in education, healthcare and public 
administration were unhappy with the provisions of the new law and the fact that there was 
no scope for them to participate in negotiations with the Government (Ciutacu, 2010). 
Consequently, 11 union federations from the public sector formed a new organisation, called 
the Alliance of Budgetary Employees. Their aim was to fight against austerity measures and 
modify the proposed reforms of the public sector pay (Trif, 2010). The Alliance organised a 
series of national protests in 2009 culminating in a one-day general strike on October 5
th
 
2009. Around 750,000 public sector employees (out of a total of 1.35 million public sector 
workers) were involved in the biggest strike since 1990. The strike’s main goals were to 
renegotiate the public sector wage law which reduced their incomes, the layoffs plans to be 
scrapped and to prevent changes to the Labour Code. Despite talks between the Alliance and 
the government representatives, the strike failed to achieve its main goals and the wage law 
remained unchanged. As the Government had the support of the EU and the IMF, this law 
was passed unilaterally by the Government without parliamentary debate or consideration of 
the key principles negotiated by the unions (i.e. no reduction of the existing salaries) in 
November 2009 (Ciutacu, 2010). This defeat made the centre-right government more 
confident that they could introduce further austerity measures. 
In 2009, the five national union confederations set up a crisis committee to protest against the 
austerity measures. First, they asked the Romanian President to reject the austerity measures 
agreed by the Prime-minister with the Troika but the President endorsed them. Second, the 
union confederations filed a complaint with the ILO in June 2010, claiming that the 
Government was breaching union rights and freedoms. They also alerted the EU bodies that 
the Government was shifting the burden of the economic crisis on employees and other 
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vulnerable sections of the population (Trif, 2010). Third, the unions identified over 400 
measures to deal with the crisis. However, their proposals were largely ignored. As a result, 
unions withdrew from most tripartite bodies. Finally, the unions organised a series of protests 
against austerity measures in May 2010, demanding that the Government make no unilateral 
decisions on austerity measures, ensures the implementation of the collective agreements and 
eliminates the restrictions on the freedom of collective bargaining from the legislation. As 
unions did not get much support from the international bodies or the public (63 percent of 
Romanians distrust unions, 15 percent more than in 2007, according to the Eurobarometer 
2010), they did not manage to safeguard the employment conditions of their members and 
their own right to have a meaningful involvement in collective bargaining and social 
dialogue. The failure of the protests against austerity measures in 2009 and 2010 ultimately 
weakened the unions’ capacity to mobilise. 
Furthermore, during the crisis, union officials suggested that there had been an organised 
campaign to intimidate and discredit the leaders of the five main confederations. The most 
notorious case was the arrest of Marius Petcu in 2011 (the leader of the largest union 
confederation, CNSRL Fratia), following an argument with President Basescu about the 
healthcare budget, according to a senior union official. Another senior union official reported 
that he was accused of tax evasion after an argument with the President and that the police 
had been sent to his house. The subsequent legal proceedings had proved his innocence. 
Nevertheless, many commentators have stated that certain union leaders are corrupt. Petcu 
was arrested for allegedly accepting a bribe from a businessman supposed to perform 
construction work at a union centre (Barbuceanu, 2012). The media reports about the alleged 
corruption of the unions’ leaders damaged their legitimacy and led to a decline in union 
membership (Trif, 2013).The corruption allegations and unsuccessful strike action against the 
substantive austerity measures led to a very weak capacity to mobilise against the centre-right 
government’s attack on unions’ fundamental rights through legal changes in 2011. 
 
Employers’ divergent responses to the crisis 
Different from unions, employers’ organisations did not have a unified response to the crisis 
and the labour law changes. In 2009 and 2010, the Council of Foreign Investors and the 
American Chamber of Commerce were involved in drafting the new labour laws and they 
were satisfied with the employment deregulation brought in by the new Labour Code and the 
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SDA. In contrast, the four largest employers’ organisations (out of 13 confederations) 
covering almost two thirds of the active labour force joined the five trade union 
confederations in their protest against the SDA, by withdrawing from the national tripartite 
institutions in September 2011 (Ciutacu, 2012). It appears that the largest four employers’ 
confederations were against the SDA, primarily because its provisions brought to an end their 
main role as representatives of employers in national collective bargaining. Also, the national 
collective agreements maintained social peace and set minimum labour standards to ensure 
fair competition between their members. A senior official representing one of the largest 
employers’ associations considered that the suppression of national-level collective 
bargaining and the new requirements for the extension of sectoral collective bargaining had a 
negative effect on the capacity of their members to deal with the economic crisis, whilst the 
increase in flexibility of labour relations had a positive effect (Hayter et al., 2013: 48-49).  
Many employers appear to be happy with the increase in their prerogative to set the terms of 
conditions of employment at the company level.  
 
1.4 The impact of the crisis on collective bargaining 
The substantive and procedural austerity measures introduced by the Government with the 
support of the Troika during the recent crisis led to the dismantling of the multi-level 
collective bargaining system which operated in Romania before the crisis. The SDA makes it 
far more difficult to negotiate collective agreements at all levels due to the implosion of 
fundamental trade union rights (see Appendix).  
First, the SDA forbids collective bargaining across sectors. Before 2011, the five union 
confederations and their employers’ counterparts negotiated annually a unique national 
collective agreement. This agreement stipulated minimum rights and obligations for the entire 
labour force in Romania. Only five (out of the 13) employers’ associations are still nationally 
representative, whilst all five unions’ confederations maintain their representative status 
(Hayter et al., 2013). Nevertheless, four unions’ confederations lost a considerable number of 
members (CNSRL Fratia has 306,486 members compared to 850,000 in 2008; CNS Cartel 
Alfa has 301,785 compared to one million in 2008; BNS has 254,527 compared to 375,000 in 
2008), whilst membership of CSN Meridian has increased from 170,000 to 320,000 (Hayter 
et al., 2013: 13). Overall, the available data suggests that trade union density has declined a 
great deal from approximately 33 percent in 2008 but there is no reliable information 
concerning trade union density or membership after the crisis (there is no information about 
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CSDR membership) (Barbuceanu, 2014). Also, there is no recent data about the employers’ 
organisations’ density, whilst in 2007 it was 60 percent (Barbuceanu, 2014: 11). Since 2011, 
the four largest employers’ confederations (Employers’ Confederation of Romanian Industry 
- CONPIROM, Patronatul Roman, Uniunea Nationala a Patronatului Roman and UGIR-
1903), together with the five unions’ confederations have been militating for the modification 
of the SDA to allow them to negotiate cross-sectoral agreements and to have meaningful 
involvement in the tripartite bodies. 
Second, the provisions of the SDA made it very difficult to negotiate collective agreements at 
sectoral level. Previously, the social partners which fulfilled the representativeness criteria 
could negotiate collective agreements that covered all employees and employers in a specific 
branch. In 2011, the social partners agreed to have 32 branches eligible for collective 
bargaining, out of which 20 had collective agreements (Trif, 2013). The new law redefined 
29 industrial sectors eligible for collective bargaining according to NACE activity codes. It 
requires the social partners to restructure and re-register with local courts and prove that they 
are representative of  the re-defined sectors. Trade union federations were keen to re-register 
to become representative of the re-defined sectors (see Barbuceanu, 2014: 13-15 for a list of 
union federations which re-applied to become representative, including those in the 
manufacturing sector), to enable them to bargain collectively on behalf of their members. 57 
union federations demanded the reacquisition of their representative status, whilst only seven 
employers’ federations re-applied to become representative at the sectoral level by the end of 
2012 (Hayter et al., 2013: 56-59). There is a disincentive for employers’ associations to 
become representative, as the new sectoral agreements apply only to employers who are 
members of the employers’ organisations which signed the collective agreement, unless the 
employers’ organisations cover more than 50 percent of the labour force in the sector (see 
Appendix). As trade union federations had no counterparts to negotiate sectoral collective 
agreements in most sectors in 2012 and 2013, no new sectoral collective agreements were 
concluded in the private sector after 2011 (Barbuceanu, 2014). There were very few 
collective agreements concluded for groups of hospitals or other public sector sub-sectors, 
such as education, research and public water supply and sewage (Hayter et al., 2013).  
Third, the SDA makes it more difficult for trade unions to negotiate agreements at the 
company level, due major procedural changes (see Appendix). The local unions had to re-
register with local courts to be entitled to negotiate collective agreements. Many local unions 
lost their representative status as the new law stipulates that union density needs to be at least 
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51 percent of the total labour force compared to one third under the previous law (if the union 
density is lower or there is no union representation in a company, elected representatives of 
employees are allowed to negotiate collective agreements). Also, the new law requires a 
minimum of 15 workers from the same company to form a union, whilst previously 15 
employees working in the same profession could form a union. The SDA makes it impossible 
for unions to bargain collectively in over 90 percent of Romanian companies that have less 
than 15 employees (Barbuceanu, 2012). Not surprisingly, the number of collective 
agreements at company level has declined (Hayter et al., 2013:23).  
Finally, the SDA makes it more difficult for unions to take industrial action. Employees are 
no longer allowed to go on strike if the provisions of a collective agreement are not 
implemented by the employer. Also, it is obligatory for the parties in conflict to undertake 
conciliation before taking industrial action under the current law, which was not the case 
before 2011. During a strike, the workers involved lose all their employment rights, except 
their healthcare insurance, whilst previously they lost only their wages. Furthermore, union 
officials were protected two years after they completed their mandate under the old laws, 
whilst an employer can fire them immediately after they finish their mandate under the 
provisions of the current Labour Code. Additionally, employees and their representatives are 
not allowed to organise industrial action, if their demands require a legal solution to solve the 
conflict, which makes it almost impossible to organise protests against legal changes. By 
2011, unions had a very weak capacity to mobilise against the centre-right government’s 
attack on unions’ fundamental rights, following unsuccessful mass demonstrations and strike 
action against austerity measures in 2009 and 2010 and the corruption allegations regarding 
national union leaders. 
Nevertheless, the union leaders of the five confederations signed a protocol in 2011 with the 
opposition. This promised to reverse the employment regulations introduced by the centre-
right coalition in exchange for unions’ support for the 2012 elections. The centre-left 
coalition came into power in 2012 but the new government made virtually no legal changes 
to the SDA until March 2014. The ILO representatives held discussions with the centre-left 
government as well as representatives of the Troika about the need to amend the current 
labour laws to comply with the ILO conventions (Hayter et al., 2013). However, the EU and 
IMF opposed most changes proposed by the social partners. Whilst the Troika endorsed legal 
changes adopted unilaterally by the centre-right government (without parliamentary debate or 
consultation with unions and employers’ representatives) which reduced the protection of 
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employees in 2011 (Trif, 2013), in their joint comments, the EU and the IMF objected to the 
use of a slightly more democratic process to modify the SDA (Law 62/2011) to comply with 
the ILO conventions:  
“We understand that the present draft was prepared by trade union confederations that 
are representative at the national level and by only four employer confederations. 
Given the importance of Law 62/2011 for labor relations in Romania, which embodies a key 
reform, we think it is inappropriate to amend this law through an emergency ordinance and 
consider it of the utmost importance to go through the normal legislative process which 
ensures a thorough preparation and proper consultation of all social partners, including all 
employer organizations representative at the national level. …we strongly urge the authorities 
to limit any amendments to Law 62/2011 to revisions necessary to bring the law into 
compliance with core ILO conventions”. (Joint Comments of European Commission and IMF 
Staff, October 2012, p. 1) 
The EC and the IMF opposed proposed changes concerning the extension of national and 
sectoral collective agreements. Specifically, they were against changes that would make it 
easier for employees to take industrial action and also asked for further reduction in unions’ 
influence, by limiting the legal protection of local employee representatives involved in 
collective bargaining. However, they agreed with the proposed changes of the local union 
representativeness criteria from over 50 percent to 35 percent and a reduction of the number 
of members required to form a union from 15 to 5. In contrast with the expectation that 
joining the EU would support workers’ rights (Kohl and Platzer, 2004), the EU had a crucial 
role in reducing employment rights and the capacity of trade unions to negotiate collective 
agreements during the recent crisis. 
 
1.5 Concluding remarks  
 
The first part of this report examines the main changes in collective bargaining since 2008, 
based on secondary data. It argues that the centre-right governments had primarily an 
ideological motivation to dismantle the multi-level collective bargaining system in place prior 
to the 2008 crisis with the support of the Troika. There was a need for structural reforms to 
redress economic imbalances but the labour market regulations were not amongst the key 
factors requiring substantial modifications (Ban, 2014). The centre-right government had a 
‘technical’ justification to introduce certain structural reforms, particularly those required by 
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the Troika to provide the promised loan (Stoiciu, 2012). However, there was an ideological 
motivation to privatise public utilities, to reduce the social and welfare provisions and to 
reduce the role and influence of trade unions in collective bargaining (Stoiciu, 2012; Trif, 
2013). 
Although both the austerity measures and the structural reforms have affected collective 
bargaining, labour law changes (associated with structural reforms) led to a radical 
transformation of the industrial relations system and damaged collective bargaining 
mechanisms, in the long run. The biggest change in collective bargaining is at the national 
level, with the SDA making it impossible for the social partners to negotiate cross-sectoral 
collective agreements. Moreover, the SDA made it very difficult to negotiate new sectoral 
agreements, due to the new legal requirements for the social partners. As a result, there were 
no new sectoral collective agreements concluded in the private sector between 2012 and 
March 2014. There has also been a massive decline in the number of collective agreements at 
the company level since 2008 (Hayter et al., 2013). Thus, the scope of joint regulation of 
terms and conditions of employment has decreased significantly, whilst there has been an 
increase in employers’(and managers’) prerogatives at the company leveldue to the erosion of 
collective and individual employees’ rights.  
Nevertheless, it is unclear to what extent employers use these new prerogatives. Although 
national-level data indicates that labour cost as a proportion of GDP has declined since 2008 
(Hayter et al., 2013: 36), the existing studies provide limited evidence concerning the 
outcomes of the collapse on national and sectoral level collective bargaining for employees, 
particularly for those working in the manufacturing sector. Previous studies focus primarily 
on the impact of the austerity measures on the terms and conditions of public sector 
employees (Hayter et al., 2013; Trif, 2013). No study was found to investigate the scope and 
the quality of the company level agreements after the collapse of national and sectoral-level 
collective agreements. It could be expected that local unions in large manufacturing 
companies would be the most likely to maintain or improve the terms and conditions of 
employment of their members, as manufacturing sectors had the highest union density in the 
country. The second part of this report examines the actual impact of labour market reforms 
on collective bargaining in manufacturing and their implications for continuity and change in 
Romanian industrial relations, based on primary data.  
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Part 2 - The Impact of the Reforms of Joint Regulation and Labour Market Policy on 
Collective Bargaining in Manufacturing 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The recent crisis led to different levels of change in industrial relations in the EU Member 
States (Marginson, 2014), with Romania being an extreme case of disorganised 
decentralisation of collective bargaining.  The deregulation of the labour market by the 
centre-right government with the support of the Troika affected both the individual and 
collective rights of employees. The Labour Code amendments made it easier for employers to 
hire and fire employees and to use flexible working time arrangements, whilst the Social 
Dialogue Act (SDA), adopted in 2011, diminished fundamental collective rights of 
employees to organise, strike and bargain collectively (Trif, 2013). This ‘frontal assault’ on 
multi-employer collective bargaining (Marginson, 2014) led to a transformation of the 
regulatory framework from a statutory system that supported collective bargaining at the 
national, sectoral and company levels to a so-called ‘voluntary’ system (interview, state 
official, 2014). Nevertheless, it is not known to what extent these legal changes have affected 
company-level collective bargaining, particularly in the private sector. 
This study investigates the actual impact of the labour market reforms on collective 
bargaining in manufacturing sectors where trade unions are relatively strong. It focuses on the 
effects of the labour law changes on collective bargaining in six companies operating in the 
metal and food sectors, where trade unions managed to prolong the sectoral collective 
agreements negotiated before the adoption of the SDA until 2015. The selection of the six 
case studies aimed to cover a wide range of developments in collective bargaining. Whilst in 
all six cases, the recent legal changes made collective bargaining far more difficult for trade 
unions, the degree of change in the terms and conditions of employment varied from radical 
changes in Food_4 (the worst case scenario) to a large degree of continuity in the Metal_5 
case (the best case scenario), with the other cases being between those two extremes. The 
findings suggest that the degree of change and continuity in the terms and conditions of 
employment at company level is contingent on three sets of inter-related factors: (a) the 
attitude of the employer (and senior management) towards employees and their 
representatives, (b) the local labour market and (c) the mobilisation capacity of the company 
trade union.  
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2.2 Methodology 
As this study seeks to examine the impact of labour market reforms on collective bargaining 
in manufacturing and their implications for continuity and change in the Romanian industrial 
relations, it is based on in-depth interviews with 25 key informants at the national, sectoral 
and company levels. At the national level, two trade union officials, an employers’ 
associations official and two government officials were interviewed. At the sectoral level, 
five trade union officials were interviewed, three from the metal sector and two from the food 
sector. Finally, 15 interviews were conducted in five metal companies and a food company; 
in four companies, both union officials and managers were interviewed, whilst in two metal 
companies only trade union officials were interviewed (see Table 1).  
The selection of the companies was based on recommendations of sectoral trade union 
officials, aiming to cover a wide range of companies, regarding the level of change and 
continuity in their terms and conditions of employment and collective bargaining 
developments since 2008. All six companies are subsidiaries of multinational corporations; 
two of them have more than 1000 employees (Metal_1 and Metal_5), two of them have 
between 500 and 1000 employees, whilst the other two have between 200 and 500 employees 
(see Table 1). Apart from the Food_4 case, employees are covered by a company collective 
agreement concluded by a representative union (meaning that union density is over 50 
percent). The preliminary findings were presented during one-day workshop attended by six 
trade union officials and an expert in Romanian industrial relations. The participants provided 
feedback on the preliminary findings as well as additional information regarding the degree 
of change and continuity in Romanian industrial relations. 
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Table 1: The profile of the case studies 
 
Case studies 
Number 
employees 
(approx.) 
Main products 
Interviews 
Degree of deterioration of terms and 
conditions of employment 
since 2011  
Total 
Trade 
unions 
Employer/HR
M/ 
Line managers 
Collective 
bargaining 
(SDA) 
Individual rights 
(Labour Code) 
Metal_1 > 3000 Automotive cables 5 √ √ 
 
Moderate 
 
High 
50 percent of labour 
force on fixed-term 
contracts 
Metal_2 700 Auto components 2 √ √ Small 
High 
4 (instead of 5) days 
working week 
Metal_3 300 White goods 3 √ √ Small 
High 
Reduced labour force 
by 40 percent 
Food_4 > 800 Mill and bread  3 √ √ 
No change 
(no company 
collective 
agreement) 
Very high 
Change from 
paternalistic 
=>autocratic 
management style 
Metal_5 1500 Steel pipes 1 √ No Small 
 
Small 
 
Metal_6 500 
Electric and 
electronic equipment 
 
1 √ No High Moderate 
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2.3 Implications of the reforms on the process and character of collective bargaining  
Frontal assault on national and sectoral collective bargaining  
Empirical findings indicated that the labour market reforms led to the destruction of national 
and sectoral collective bargaining, whilst it was suggested that post-communist legacies 
rather than the crisis led to those reforms. According to state officials, the Government had to 
change the statutory system that supported collective bargaining to a so-called ‘voluntary’ 
system (interviews, 2014), due to ownership changes linked to the privatisation of the state-
owned enterprises. It was argued that most employment laws were passed before the mid-
1990s, when the majority of companies were state-owned. In that context, the national trade 
unions managed to establish a regulatory framework in favour of employees and trade unions. 
Additionally, “there was a cascading increase in the obligations imposed to employers by 
collective agreements concluded at national, sectoral and company levels” (Interview, 
Government official, 2014). Consequently, the government sought to develop a ‘voluntary’ 
collective bargaining system, by abolishing the legal obligations of the representative 
employers’ associations and trade unions to get involved in collective bargaining at cross-
sectoral and sectoral levels. According to government officials, the main aim of the labour 
market reforms was to get collective bargaining at the company level to reflect the new 
economic and social circumstances of private companies. 
Most respondents (except government officials) indicated that labour market reforms were 
initiated by the American Chamber of Commerce and other foreign investors in Romania. 
Respondents indicated that there was an informal government committee which consulted the 
representatives of foreign investors, whilst the official channels of consultation with the trade 
unions and employers’ associations were ignored by the Government. Also, specific large 
multinational corporations, such as Arcelor Mittal Galati, (which employs around 8000 
employees) have affected the provisions on the SDA.  Following a two day strike in 2008 
(workers asked for 30 percent pay increase but the strike was declared illegal by a local 
court), Arcelor Mittal made a complaint that the provision of the trade union law (Law 
54/2003), which required employers to provide up to five days paid time off per month to 
local union officials for union activities, are unconstitutional. This case was sent to the 
Constitutional Court, which upheld the claim of Arcelor Mittal
i
. This decision was 
incorporated into the new labour law (SDA). Thus, there is no longer a statutory requirement 
for employers to provide paid time off for union activities.   
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Although all employers held the view that the former labour laws were in favour of 
employees and needed to be reformed to re-establish a balance of power between employers 
and employees, their views varied in terms of the degree of change needed. The employers’ 
associations official (representing one of the four employers’ confederations which was 
against the adoption of the SDA) argued that national and sectoral collective agreements were 
needed to ensure social peace, to avoid social dumping and to set the national minimum 
wage. Additionally, this respondent made reference to the broader consequences concerning 
the unilateral decision making by the Government, as suggested by the following quote:  
In fact, the Law 62 [SDA] has divided and reduced significantly the influence of both social 
partners, employers’ associations and trade unions. …This is very convenient for the 
Government, as it allows it to impose very easily any decisions (Employer Association 
Official, 2014). 
In a similar vein, the CEO of Metal_3 indicated that multi-employer collective bargaining is 
needed to avoid social dumping and, more broadly, he considered that trade unions should 
have the right to bargain collectively at different levels. The view of this CEO is rather 
exceptional, which seems to be linked to his extensive work experience in France. According 
to the employers’ association official, many members opted out of employers’ organisations 
(or threatened to opt out), in order to avoid the implementation of the provisions of multi-
employer collective agreements. Findings suggest that the vast majority of employers and 
senior managers welcomed the labour law reforms that led to the decentralisation of 
collective bargaining.  
Nevertheless, the extent to which labour law reforms damaged the employers’ associations 
was rather surprising; i.e. only five (out of 13) representative employers’ associations in 2010 
were still representative in 2014. Furthermore, representative employers’ associations seem to 
have only a perfunctory role in bi- and tripartite institutions, as they are no longer involved in 
collective bargaining. The fact that employers’ associations have a very limited role and 
influence at the national and sectoral levels seems to be the main reason for the refusal of 
other employers’ associations’ officials to be interviewed or to participate in the workshop 
related to this project. 
Similar to employers’ associations, the role and influence of the national and sectoral union 
organisations in collective bargaining has decreased a great deal since the adoption of the 
SDA in 2011. The recommendations and the support of the Troika of the European Union, 
IMF and ECB for labour market deregulation made it almost impossible for the unions to 
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defend against the destruction of the multi-employer collective bargaining institutions (Trif, 
2014). Nevertheless, union officials mentioned that the attack on employment rights and 
fundamental union rights did not lead to an increase in the internal cohesion and solidarity of 
the union movement. As the legal employment rights were achieved primarily through 
tripartite consultation at the national level in the 1990s, the national unions found it very 
difficult to mobilise workers and local unions, as they are not used to fighting for their legal 
rights. 
Although national union confederations and federations have not been able to negotiate new 
collective agreements that cover all employees at national or sectoral levels, since 2011, a 
number of sectoral unions negotiated multi-employer collective agreements. According to the 
data provided by a trade union confederation (CSDR), there are 24 multi-employer collective 
agreements valid in 2014. Out of those, seven are labelled as sectoral collective agreements 
but they cover solely employees in companies where the employer is a member of the 
employers’ association that signed the collective agreement. The unions in the healthcare 
sector are seeking to extend the current multi-employer collective agreement to the entire 
healthcare sector using the provisions of the SDA. Although the quantitative requirements for 
extension are fulfilled in this sector (i.e. the employers who signed the collective agreement 
cover more than 50 percent of the sectoral labour force), the new procedures for the extension 
of sectoral collective agreements are ambiguous and allow a minority of private employers to 
block its extension. Union officials mentioned that this is a very important case (a rule-
maker), as it is likely to be used as a reference for further requests to extend sectoral 
collective agreements. 
Out of the seven sectoral collective agreements
ii
, three are in the private sector. All three are 
in manufacturing sectors and were negotiated under the old labour laws (before 2011) and 
extended through additional acts until 2015. The collective agreement in the glass and 
ceramic products sector covers 39 companies. It provides a higher sectoral minimum wage 
(an additional 25 RON  - 5.6 euro - to the national minimum wage per month). The collective 
agreement in the food, beverage and tobacco sector covers 770 companies but it does not 
cover the Food_4 case study, as the employer is not a member of the employers’ association 
that negotiated this agreement. In contrast, the Metal_5 case is covered by the collective 
agreement concluded for the Electronics, Electrical Machinery and other equipment 
production sector, which applies to a total of 108 companies. Similar to most Romanian 
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companies, the other four case studies are not covered by multi-employer collective 
agreements.  
Although the number of sectoral agreements has decreased a great deal since the recession
iii
, 
the number of collective agreements for groups of companies has increased from four in 2008 
to 16 in 2013 (Table 2). A trade union official who participated in the negotiation of a multi-
employer collective agreement in the automotive industry indicated that there have been 
significant changes in the process of collective bargaining since 2008. In 2010, the two 
representative trade unions’ federations for the automotive sector negotiated (under the old 
legislation) with the Employers Federation of the Machine-Building Industry (FEPA) an 
addendum to the sectoral collective agreement for 2011-2012. Ford Craiova joined the FEPA 
in 2010 to lead these negotiations.  
Ford wanted to get a vague sectoral collective agreement to provide more scope for 
negotiations at the local level (i.e. to get rid of wage scales, to decentralise the setting of 
working time, including lunch breaks and the payment for overtime and weekends at 
company level). Ford employed a consultancy law firm to negotiate the addendum on behalf 
of the FEPA. As this was the first time when unions had to negotiate with a consultancy firm, 
union officials found the bargaining process very difficult. The lawyers based their 
negotiations on the minimum legal provisions of labour laws as well as other laws covered by 
the Romanian Civil Code. It took four months to negotiate the addendum in 2010, whilst the 
previous negotiations of the sectoral agreement took 30 days. Although this addendum 
provided more flexibility for individual employers (i.e.  to set overtime payment and pensions 
for workers who had work accidents at company level), a third of employers (148) opted out 
of FEPA in 2011, including Dacia Renault, which is the largest employer in the sector. Thus, 
employers which do not want to be covered by multi-employer collective agreements opt out 
of the employers’ associations.  
In 2012, the two representative trade union federations negotiated with the representatives of 
FEPA another multi-employer collective agreement for two years, which covers only 40 
companies from the automotive sector, representing less than 10 percent of the companies 
covered by the sectoral collective agreement in 2010. Although workers at Dacia Renault are 
no longer covered by a multi-employer agreement, they have the best terms and conditions of 
employment in the sector, as the company continued to be profitable during the recession and 
it has a very strong local union (Interview, union federation official, 2014). All the 
respondents indicated that the company is the main level where the actual terms and 
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conditions of employment are established. Although this was also the case before the crisis, 
the company-level negotiations used to start from the provisions negotiated at higher levels. 
 
Table 2:  Number of valid collective agreements (CA) between 2008 and 2013 
Year Group of companies Company/workplace 
2008 4 11,729 
2009 9 10,569 
2010 7 7,718 
2011 8 (a new CA plus seven additional acts to existing 
CAs) 
8,317 
2012 8 8,783 
2013 16 8,726 
Source: Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Protection (2014) 
 
Increasing the imbalance of power in favour of employers at company level 
The number of company-level collective agreements has also declined from 11,729 in 2008 
to 8,726 in 2013 (Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Protection, 2014). There was a 
major decline of approximately 3000 collective agreements between 2008 and 2010, whilst 
their number increased by circa 1000 collective agreements in 2011 and 2012, registering a 
slight decrease in 2013 (see Table 2). Overall the number of company level agreements 
declined by 25 percent between 2008 and 2013, whilst the biggest reduction took place 
before the adoption of the SDA in 2011.  
The legal reforms made the collective bargaining process more difficult at the company level, 
although in the five cases which had a collective agreement (except Food_4), local unions 
were representative under the SDA (union density was over 50 percent of the total labour 
force). In these companies, local union officials indicated that that they start negotiations 
from ‘zero’, whilst before 2011 they started the negotiations from the provisions agreed at the 
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sectoral level. There were better provisions negotiated at the sectoral level regarding 
minimum wage, wage increases linked to inflation, payment of overtime, holiday 
entitlements, etc., whilst wage scales were negotiated at the national level. Two local officials 
revealed that they almost took for granted the provisions of the national and sectoral 
agreements, whilst they realised their importance when those agreements ceased to exist.  
According to the respondents, the main factor that affects the company collective bargaining 
process is the attitude of employers and senior management towards the local union. For 
instance, the senior managers have been rather hostile towards trade unions since the 2000s in 
the Metal_6 case, when the majority of the shares in the company were bought by an 
investor. The relations between the management and the union were very good previously, 
when managers and employees owned the company (the company was initially privatised 
through the MEBO method in the 1990s). Immediately after the legal reforms, the 
management told unions that they were going to apply the new legal provisions. First, the 
company stopped collecting the union fees and encouraged supervisors and workers to leave 
the union. According to a union respondent, the senior management changed most of the 
middle managers (around 60-70 percent) and asked the new managers to use both the ‘carrot’ 
(‘bribe’ supervisors  - the respondent indicated that he has seen lump sums on their payroll) 
and the ‘stick’, by threatening to fire them. These tactics led to a decline in union 
membership by 25 percent in a couple of months. Second, the senior management made it far 
more difficult for unions to communicate with their members, prohibiting union officials 
from discussing with members during their hours of work or posting any information 
regarding union activities, in the company. Third, the management divided the company into 
seven independent undertakings and made it far more difficult for unions to get relevant 
information for the bargaining purposes. The union had to re-register with the local court and 
prove that they were representative for each undertaking in order to be able to negotiate a 
collective agreement for each unit. Overall, the process of collective bargaining has become 
more adversarial and more difficult for unions in the case of Metal_6 after the legal reforms.  
In the other four case studies from the metal industry, the attitude of employers and senior 
managers towards unions was rather co-operative. In the Metal_1 case, the HR manager 
indicated that the company preferred not to take advantage of the new provisions of the 
legislation regarding collective bargaining, as the ‘labour laws might change again’ 
(interview, 2014). Nevertheless, the collective bargaining process has become far more 
difficult, as the union finds it difficult to unionise and represent half of the labour force which 
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is on fixed-term contracts. The company used the new provisions of the Labour Code, which 
makes it easier for employers to employ workers on fixed term contracts and virtually all new 
employees were employed on fixed-term contracts after 2011. In a similar vein, in the 
Metal_3 case, the union has very good relations with the senior management and their 
relationship has not changed since 2011 but the union was unable to defend against the 
reduction by 40 percent of the labour force, due to the new provisions of the Labour Code, 
which makes it easier to hire and fire employees.  
Similar developments took place in the case of Metal_2. The union has good relations with 
the current senior management team and there have been no changes in the process of 
collective bargaining but the management reduced the working week from five to four days 
during the summer months, as the new provisions of the Labour Code allow employers to do 
so. Somewhat surprisingly, the union official mentioned that the collective bargaining 
process was far more difficult before 2008, when there was a different main shareholder of 
the company, who was not very keen to negotiate with the union. In a context of 
decentralisation of collective bargaining and legal reforms that provide more prerogatives to 
employers to decide the terms and conditions of employment, it is not surprising that the 
power of individual employers and senior managers to set the terms and conditions of 
employment has increased, even in companies where trade unions managed to negotiate 
collective agreements. 
The large degree of continuity in the bargaining process in four (out of the five) case studies 
where unions are relatively strong, as well as in the case of Dacia Pitesti (which has the 
strongest company union in Romania, according to national union officials), indicate that 
individual employers did not really need the new labour laws to redress the power balance in 
their favour. As these cases are amongst a minority of companies, where union density is 
over 50 percent, the empirical findings support unions’ view that the legal reforms have 
increased the imbalance of power in favour of employers rather than redressing the power 
balance between employers and trade unions. According to a senior union official 
the previous legal framework ensured a degree of equilibrium of power between the two 
parties [trade unions and employers]; the new laws are solely about the needs of employers. 
Trade unions do not count, even if they have 100 percent union density. (Union confederation 
official, 2014) 
The next section examines the actual impact of the reforms on the terms and conditions of 
employment of employees.  
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2.4 Implications of the reforms for the content and outcome of collective bargaining at 
sectoral and company level, on wages and working time in particular 
 
The impact of the reforms on workers’ outcomes  
Although the legal reforms reduced significantly joint regulation of the terms and conditions 
of employment by social partners
iv
, there are still three sectoral collective agreements in the 
manufacturing sector. As these agreements were negotiated before the major changes in the 
labour laws in 2011, there have been no major changes in their content and outcome. In the 
food, drinks and tobacco industry, the latest sectoral negotiations took place in 2010, when 
the 2006 collective agreement was prolonged until 2015 via an addendum. This addendum 
changed only an article in the sectoral agreement; it increased the sectoral minimum wage to 
650 RON.  Nevertheless, the national minimum wage was increased to 670 RON in 2011. 
Hence, the sectoral minimum wage is the same as the national minimum wage, whilst it used 
to be 20 percent higher than the national minimum wage in the previous sectoral agreement. 
A union official considered that they were rather lucky that they managed to prolong the 
2006 sectoral agreement (which expired in 2010) before the legal reforms of 2011. Different 
from the automotive sector, where a collective agreement was negotiated after the legal 
changes in 2011
v
, there were no changes regarding wage scales, payment of overtime and 
working time in the content of the sectoral collective agreement in the food, drinks and 
tobacco industry. 
The biggest change in the outcome of current sectoral agreements is the fact that it covers 
only employers that are members of the employers’ association that signed that collective 
agreement. According to union officials interviewed, the new legislation is unclear regarding 
the extension mechanism for the agreements signed before the adoption of the SDA. Trade 
unions argued that those collective agreements should cover all companies in the sector. In 
2012, the representative union federations from the food industry took this claim to the 
relevant court and got a decision in their favour but this decision is contested by the 
government officials. They indicate that sectoral agreements should cover only those 
employers that signed the agreement, in accordance with the new labour legislation. Despite 
having a valid sectoral collective agreement in the food, drinks and tobacco industry, local 
unions affiliated to a representative federation (which negotiated the sectoral agreement) are 
unable to use it as a starting point for local negotiations if the employer is not part of the 
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employers’ association. In practice, it appears that all sectoral agreements are implemented 
according to the provisions of the SDA, as indicated by the case of the Food_4 company. 
The unilateral management decision making is well illustrated by the worst case scenario for 
employees found in the Food_4 case. This company, which has approximately 900 
employees, is one of the leaders on the Romanian milling and bread manufacturing market. It 
was privatised in the late 1990s, being bought by a Greek family business. The company had 
a strong company trade union before the privatisation (interview, sectoral union official, 
2014). In the early 2000s, when the company moved its main location to the outskirts of a 
city, the employer decided to improve unilaterally the terms and conditions of employment 
and encouraged workers to leave the union. In these circumstances, the company union was 
dissolved. Respondents indicated that the Greek employer and senior management team had a 
paternalistic approach to managing people, offering good wages and individual financial 
support to their workers (i.e. personal loans and financial help if they had somebody sick in 
the family). Hence, employees were reasonable happy with their terms and conditions of 
employment.  
The change of ownership led to major changes in the management style. During the recent 
crisis, the Greek company sold its shares to an Austrian holding company, which got over 95 
percent of the Food_4 company shares in 2013. Respondents suggested that the holding 
group wished to restructure the company very quickly and sell it in a couple of years. In order 
to do so, the new owner decided to change all the managers in the company (similar tactic to 
that used in the Metal_4 case). The company initially employed a new senior management 
team on fixed term contracts, to make sure that the employer had control over them. Their 
first task was to replace virtually all middle managers. The management employed a new 
cohort of middle managers, initially by getting two managers for each middle/line manager 
position and then gradually firing the managers employed before 2013. According to a former 
HR Manager, they initially fired the most vulnerable managers, such as single mothers, 
parents with small children and older workers who had less than two years before they 
retired. The fired managers got a month’s notice but they were prohibited to come to work or 
visit their workplace during the notice period, which made it very difficult for those managers 
to talk to each other. The company provided the minimum redundancy compensation 
specified by law, not the seven month’s salaries as indicated in the sectoral collective 
agreement. In this context, some line managers contacted a former HR Director to ask for her 
advice.  
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A recently fired middle manager tried to bring in the former HR manager to help him 
negotiate with the new management to keep his job and/or get a better redundancy package 
but he was told in a very hostile manner “if you do not like it, you can sue the company” 
(interview, 2014). The respondents indicated that the employment climate in the company is 
very poor and most managers and workers are afraid that they will lose their jobs. The 
respondents did not know how many managers or non-managerial employees have already 
been fired. A middle manager, with the help of the union federation and the former HR 
Director, approached other middle managers that had been fired and set up a company union 
to try to defend their rights. This new union was just registered with the relevant court when 
the interviews took place in 2014. The new union has asked the representative union 
federation in the sector to represent them for the purpose of collective bargaining at the 
company level, which is allowed under the provisions of the SDA. This was an extreme case 
of a non-unionised company, where the change of employer led to the alteration of the 
management’s attitude towards employees from a paternalistic management style to a rather 
autocratic style. These changes affected particularly employees’ job security and the 
employment climate. It would be very interesting to follow up this case to find out to what 
extent the newly established union manages to defend employees’ rights. 
In all case studies, respondents indicated that the attitude of the employer and local senior 
management team towards employees and unions had the most important effect on the degree 
of change in the actual terms and conditions of employment. In the Metal_6 case, the hostile 
attitude towards unions led to an increase in the number of conflicts, which were taken by the 
union to the relevant courts for resolution. In the other cases, the managers used primarily the 
new provisions of the Labour Code which allow employers to make more flexible 
employment contracts and working time arrangements. In the case of Metal_1, the 
management changed full-time contracts to fixed term employment contracts for half of their 
labour force; in the Metal_2 case, the management reduced the working week from five to 
four days when the demand for their products declined during the summer; finally, the 
management of Metal_5 reduced its labour force by 40 percent, due to a reduction in demand 
for their products. Overall, respondents indicated that managers use the flexible working time 
arrangements provided by the reformed laws to deal with the fluctuation in demand for their 
products. 
The respondents also indicated that the influence of employers and senior management teams 
in setting wages has increased due the major reduction of the coverage of multi-employer 
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collective agreements, as well as specific legal reforms. The new Labour Code specifies that 
it is the management’s prerogative to decide unilaterally the targets for specific job 
categories, whilst previously managers were obliged to negotiate those targets with unions. 
This prerogative makes it rather easy for managers to increase the workload of employees by 
increasing the targets for specific jobs, without pay increases. In the sectors where there are 
multi-employer collective agreements, if employers are not willing to implement the 
provisions of the collective agreement, they can opt out of the employers’ association. 
Previously, all employers in the sector had to implement collective agreements concluded at 
higher levels by representative social partners.  
Also, the influence of local senior management over pay has increased, as in most companies, 
they do not have to consider the provisions negotiated at the higher levels. For instance, in the 
case of Metal_1, an increase in wages in line with the inflation applied automatically to all 
companies covered by the sectoral agreement until 2011, whilst the inflation is now included 
in the percentage of wage increases negotiated at the company level. The wages for newly 
employed low-skilled employees were above the minimum wage before 2011, whilst 
currently they get only the minimum wage. All respondents indicated that the influence of 
employers and senior managers on determining wages has increased greatly since the recent 
legal reforms. 
In addition, the decentralisation of collective bargaining led to an increase in local 
benchmarking. The union officials (and other respondents) indicated that the local labour 
market and wage levels in similar companies in the area represented the main reference for 
wage bargaining.  In the case of Metal_1, the union benchmarked their wages against those in 
the Metal_2 case, which has the highest wages in the region. Union respondents in the 
Metal_1 case indicated that wages are currently higher in another factory, which is located in 
the same area as Dacia Renault, which has the highest wages in the manufacturing sector. As 
the local benchmarking has become more important after the collapse of national and sectoral 
agreements, the unions from Metal_1 and Metal_2 decided to withdraw their affiliations to 
two different national federations and created a regional union federation to enable them to 
co-ordinate their local collective bargaining. Thus, the importance of wage developments in 
the local market has increased since the recession, whilst there have been no changes 
regarding the influence of firms’ economic performance, labour productivity and the quality 
of goods produced on setting wages. 
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Finally, findings suggest that the ability of local unions to increase wages and defend against 
the deterioration of other terms and conditions of employment is contingent on the capacity 
of unions to mobilise members to take industrial action. The best case scenario was found in 
the case of Dacia Renault Pitesti, where workers’ terms and conditions of employment have 
not deteriorated since the recession. Apart from having one of the largest company unions in 
terms of membership (over 13,000 members), the union at Dacia Renault Pitesti managed to 
increase the annual wage by 350 RON (80 euro), following a 16-day strike in 2008. In a 
similar vein, in the cases of Metal_5 and Metal_1, union officials indicated that the fact that 
they have proven to management that members are willing to go on strike to support the 
union’s position during the process of collective bargaining, enabled them to increase wages 
after the 2011 labour reforms. In contrast, a union official indicated that his union 
organisation has very limited influence during the collective bargaining process because the 
union is unable to mobilise workers who are concerned with job insecurity, despite the fact 
that virtually all workers are union members (workshop discussion, 2014).  
Summing up, in a context of disorganised decentralisation of collective bargaining, the case 
studies illustrate great variation concerning the impact of reforms on the actual terms and 
conditions of employment. The degree of change in the terms and conditions of employment 
for employees varied from radical changes in Food_4 and Metal_6 cases to a large degree of 
continuity in the Metal_5 case, with the other cases between those two extremes (Table 2). In 
the companies where the demand for their products decreased since the recession, employers 
used the new provisions of the Labour Code to get more flexible working time and atypical 
employment contracts (i.e. Metal_1, Metal_2 and Metal_3). Whilst working time 
arrangements have been changed unilaterally by employers, wages and other terms and 
conditions of employments have been negotiated via collective bargaining in five cases which 
have representative unions. The ability of unions to maintain or improve the terms and 
conditions of employment through collective bargaining has been affected by three main 
interrelated factors, namely (a) the attitude of the employer and senior management to 
employees and their representatives, (b) the local labour market and developments in 
collective bargaining in other large companies in a specific area; and, (c) the union strength 
and the history of the relations between the local unions and management. 
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Implications of the reforms for the social partners  
As the main purpose of the labour market reforms was to provide more power to individual 
employers to set the terms and conditions of employment, it is not surprising that the reforms 
led to reduction of the role and influence of trade unions and employers’ associations. All 
respondents indicated that the national confederations and many federations lost their main 
role in collective bargaining. Additionally, their role in the tripartite and/or bi-partite bodies 
has been reduced a great deal, whilst the Government’s role in industrial relations has 
increased. According to an employers’ association official,  
Law 62 [SDA] has fragmented unions and employers’ associations in Romania and reduced 
their power. It is clear that having weak social partners is convenient for the Romanian 
government; without strong social partners, the government can easily impose their decisions. 
(Interview, 2014) 
Representatives of both employers’ association and unions revealed that there is very limited 
dialogue between the social partners and the government. Whilst prior 2011, the minimum 
wage was negotiated by the social partners, currently it is decided unilaterally by the 
government. Also, a new National Tripartite Council was established under the provisions of 
the SDA, but it has rather a ‘decorative’ function (interviews, 2014). Apart for the fact that its 
administrative procedures are unclear, it currently comprises 30 government representatives, 
six employers’ representatives and five union representatives, which makes it very easy for 
government representatives to impose their views on any matter. Thus, the state intervention 
in industrial relations has increased. Furthermore, since 2011 the state has been supporting 
the prerogative of employers to set the terms and conditions of employment at the company 
level, in contrast to its role prior 2010, when it supported primarily workers’ rights.  
The decentralisation of collective bargaining led to the disorganisation of employers’ 
associations. There are only five (out of 13) employers’ organisations that are still 
representative at the national level. In a context of favourable regulations, employers do not 
need to be members of employers’ organisations. By and large, individual employers are 
content with the provisions of the new Labour Code and the SDA. They used the new 
provisions of the Labour Code, which allow more flexibility, to deal with the fluctuations in 
demand for their products (i.e. Metal_1, Metal_2 and Metal_3). Most employers prefer to set 
the terms and conditions of employment at the company level, sometimes with the help of 
consultancy law firms. As a result, many employers opted out of employers’ associations. 
Furthermore, union officials revealed that employers often select representatives for multi-
34 
 
employer bargaining and/or bi- and tripartite institutions that do not have a mandate to take 
any decisions.  
The SDA enhanced not only the influence of individual employers but also the influence of 
the local unions in relation to other echelons in the union movement. The tensions between 
the company-level unions and (con)federations have increased a great deal since 2011. As 
confederations and many federations are no longer negotiating collective agreements, the 
company unions (which collect the membership fees) are contesting the distribution of 
membership fees. The local unions started retaining a higher percentage of the membership 
fees, which led to financial difficulties for some federations and confederations. Also, it was 
revealed by respondents that some local unions report lower number of members to reduce 
the amount of fees paid to federations and confederations.  
According to national union officials, in many highly unionised large companies, local union 
officials use their position to get personal gains, as indicated by the following quote:  
The large majority of local leaders (not all of them) act like they are owners of the company 
unions.  Very few of them consult their members and involve them in the decisions taken. With 
these ‘ownership rights’ over the union organisation, union leaders use their position to get 
involved in local politics, make money and to get a high power status in the local community. 
(Interview, national union confederation, 2014) 
This behaviour leads to a vicious circle; if federations and confederations try to do something 
about it, the local unions threaten withdrawal from federations and confederations, and the 
(con)federations lose their financial resources and their representative status. 
Additionally, legal reforms and the reduction of the resources, due to a decrease in 
membership for many unions, led to tensions between federations and confederations. Whilst 
confederations cooperated to fight against austerity measures and the legal reforms in the first 
years of the recession (Trif, 2014), there seems to have been less cooperation since the 
adoption the legal reforms in 2011. For instance, it was revealed that the BNS initiative to 
change the new Labour Code had rather limited support from the other union confederations. 
Although the SDA threatened the union movement in Romania, it led to divisions within and 
amongst organisations rather than solidarity. 
Nevertheless, some union federations have got a more active role in local bargaining since 
2011 but their role and influence depends on the willingness of the local unions to involve 
them. Whilst the status of local unions within unions’ hierarchies was enhanced, their 
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influence vis-à-vis employers has declined. In the companies where unions have more than 
50 percent density, local unions negotiate the collective agreements from a weaker position 
(i.e. lower legal labour standards, less legal protection for union officials, more difficulties in 
striking, reduction of union membership, such as in the cases of Metal_1 and Metal_6). In the 
companies where unions are no longer representative, the local unions need to cooperate with 
the ‘elected’ representatives of employees during the bargaining process. As employees’ 
representatives are generally selected by the management team and have no collective 
bargaining experience according to respondents, they often undermine unions during the 
negotiation process (interviews, 2014). Nevertheless, collective bargaining is still possible in 
those unionised companies, particularly if the local union is affiliated to a representative 
federation, which can negotiate (if asked) on their behalf.  
In contrast, companies with less than 20 employees (and the majority of larger non-unionised 
companies) are no longer covered by any joint regulations, which led to an increase in the 
grey labour market. The number of workers without an employment contract or paid national 
minimum wage plus cash in hand, has increased due to the lack of the national and sector 
agreements
vi
, particularly in small enterprises. This has negative consequences for all parties; 
for the State, it reduces the financial contributions of workers and employers to the budget; 
for employers, there is unfair competition from those who avoid paying the payroll taxes to 
the State; for unions, it reduces their capacity to organise those vulnerable workers and makes 
it more difficult to improve wages for the legally employed workers. The state officials 
indicated that the Government has increased the number of labour inspectors and the fines for 
illegal work but they recognised that the new legal provisions did not manage to tackle this 
issue, yet. According to some respondents, there are not enough labour inspectors and some 
of them are corrupt.  
Representatives of both employers’ associations and unions have rather negative views of the 
state intervention in industrial relations. They consider that Romania was used as a ‘guinea 
pig’ by the foreign investors with the support of IMF and the European Union, to radically 
decentralise collective bargaining. According to a union official, 
The Romanian government has been very weak. Romania is a case study, a ‘guinea pig’. All the 
labour market reforms were initiated and adopted at the recommendation of two players; one is 
the American Chamber of Commerce and the other one is the Foreign Investors Council. The 
Romanian model has been exported to other central and eastern European countries and foreign 
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investors wish to extend it in Western European countries.  (Interview, union confederation 
official, 2014) 
Romania is perceived by unions and Romanian employers to be a ‘rule-maker’ in terms of the 
decentralisation of collective bargaining in the EU.  
Summing up, the labour market reforms led to three inter-related consequences for the social 
partners: (a) it  resulted in a considerable decline in the role and influence of the union 
movement and employers’ associations, whilst the influence  of the individual employers and 
the State in setting the terms and conditions of employment has increased; (b) although the 
legal reforms threaten the existence of the employers’ associations and unions, they led to 
divisions within both unions and employers’ organisations rather than solidarity; and (c) the 
reduction of joint regulation and the decentralisation of collective bargaining made it easier 
for employers not to implement the labour laws and the provisions of the collective 
agreements (i.e. Food_4), which led to an increase in the grey labour market.  
 
2.5. Discussion and conclusion: general trends regarding change and continuity in IR 
This report examines the impact of labour market reforms on collective bargaining in 
strongly unionised manufacturing sectors, highlighting the main implications in terms of 
continuity and change in Romanian industrial relations. The empirical findings suggest that 
the legal reforms led to a radical decentralisation of the Romanian industrial relations system, 
as the national confederations and many sectoral unions’ and employers’ organisations lost 
their main raison d’être, namely to negotiate collective agreements. Although there are multi-
employer collective agreements in the metal and food sectors, the empirical findings indicate 
a decentralisation and fragmentation of collective bargaining, even in these strongly 
unionised sectors. 
The degree of change and continuity in the actual terms and conditions of employment at 
company level is contingent on three sets of inter-related factors;  
(a) First and foremost, it depends on the attitude  of the employer (and senior 
management) to employees and their representatives; the attitude of the employer varied from 
rather cooperative in the Metal_5, Metal_2 and Metal_3 cases, to hostile in Food_4 and 
Metal_6 cases; although this is not surprising, considering the decentralisation of collective 
bargaining, the fact that some union respondents perceived that the attitude of the 
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employer/senior management to employees affected more developments in company 
collective bargaining than the recent legal changes was surprising. 
(b) Second, it was somewhat unexpected that union officials, as well as managers 
interviewed, considered that the local labour market and developments in collective 
bargaining in other large companies in a specific area affect more greatly the provisions of 
collective agreements than the strength of the company trade union (in terms of union 
membership, density and  mobilisation capacity); in all five companies which had a collective 
agreement, both unions and managers considered that the outcomes of collective bargaining 
in other companies in the area affected the process and the outcomes of collective bargaining 
in their company; Metal_6 was considered by a union official as a ‘rule maker’, in the sense 
that it was the first company in the area where the senior management implemented the new 
provisions of the SDA, despite having a rather strong trade union. 
(c) Finally, the union strength and the history of the relations between the local unions 
and management have affected company collective bargaining, particularly in the Metal_5 
and Metal_1 cases, where the unions have proven their capacity to mobilise their members in 
the last five years; also, the worst deterioration of the terms and conditions of employment 
was in the Food_4 case, which was not unionised; the hostile attitude of the senior managers 
towards middle managers and employees in the Food_4 case led to the creation of a new 
trade union.  
The reforms led to a great increase in the influence of individual employers in setting the 
terms and conditions of employment, whilst the role and influence of national and sectoral 
unions and employers’ organisations has decreased a great deal. Whilst the reduction of the 
influence of unions’ and employers’ associations in industrial relations was expected, the 
extent of the decline and divisions within these organisations was surprising; many national 
level organisations, particularly employers’ associations appear to be on the verge of 
collapse, as they no longer have a role in collective bargaining and their role in tripartite 
institutions is minimal (if any). In this context, it could be expected that these organisations 
would seek to find solutions to survive.  
One of the five union confederations, BNS used this crisis as an opportunity to restructure 
itself and change its main role from collective bargaining to providing individual services for 
its members. The union did a survey of all their members to find out their current and future 
needs. Primarily based on the information collected via this survey, the union created an 
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electronic platform which focuses on providing individual services ranging from support in 
finding jobs and career progression, to health and safety regulations and support with 
individual negotiations and grievances. This system was established well before 2008 but it 
could not be implemented before the crisis due to resistance from local union leaders. The 
new system provides transparency regarding the activity of local unions and reduces to some 
extent the power of local union leaders, as it makes it easier for members to get access to 
specific services provided by union federations and confederations. Also, the platform makes 
it easier for members to communicate with unions’ federations or confederations. Last but not 
least, it makes it easier for members to get union support when they change jobs, even if they 
decide to work abroad. Nevertheless, the new system was operating only on a pilot basis 
when the research was conducted in 2014. Therefore, it is not possible to assess its 
effectiveness, yet.  
Most respondents revealed that they want the State to ‘rescue’ and revive industrial relations 
institutions through labour law changes but this seems unlikely in the near future. None of the 
respondents were optimistic that the current centre-left government would provide more 
statutory support for employee and union rights. The view of the state officials interviewed 
was that Romania needs a decentralised ‘voluntary’ system, where individual employers 
negotiate with unions or representatives of workers at the company level. They indicated that 
the government would consider legal changes, solely if the employers and unions reach an 
agreement on specific modifications. As individual employers are happy with the current 
legal framework, it is unlikely that this is going to happen in the near future. Union officials 
mentioned that in some companies, there were unorganised protests by discontented workers 
in the last couple of years. If this trend continues, employers may wish to change the legal 
framework to ensure social peace. 
The Romanian government changed the regulatory framework from a statutory system that 
supported collective bargaining at the national, sectoral and company levels to a so-called 
‘voluntary’ system, which made it almost impossible to negotiate new national and sectoral 
collective agreements between 2011 to 2014. The state officials argued that the main reason 
for those changes was the privatisation of companies and not necessary the recent crisis. 
Findings indicate that ownership changes had a key role in triggering the transformation of 
the industrial system in Romania. Although these changes appear to be linked to the post-
socialist legacies of the privatisation of the state-owned companies, representatives of both 
unions’ and employers’ organisations argued that the new legal framework was initiated by 
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foreign investors. Moreover, a national union leader suggested that “the actual text of the 
labour laws was given to Boc’s government by the foreign investors and transposed verbatim 
into legislation” (interview, 2014). Thus, the deregulation of the Romanian labour market 
seems to be better explained by the rise of neo-liberal policies and globalisation. 
Similar to other Southern European countries, especially Greece, the Romanian labour laws 
that supported collective bargaining have been radically changed since 2008, which led to a 
rapid demolition of the collective bargaining institutions at national and sectoral levels 
(Koukiadaki and Kokkino, 2014; Marginson, 2014). These changes empowered employers to 
reduce employment rights and weakened the influence of trade unions in many unionised 
companies. These developments in collective bargaining and industrial relations support the 
view that statutory labour laws are not sufficient to uphold employment rights (Hyman, 
2014).  
In contrast to Bohle and Greskovits’ (2012) argument that Romania has a weak state that 
concedes to union demands, the recent changes in collective bargaining point instead to a 
relatively strong state (due to the external support of the Troika) and weak unions. The 
Government’s disregard for the provisions of collective agreements, the legislative changes 
and the alleged intimidation of union leaders have led to a decline of union legitimacy and 
their influence in collective bargaining. The recession was used as a pretext by the centre-
right government to reform the industrial relations system. The so-called Social Dialogue Act 
was passed unilaterally by the Government without being debated in Parliament and without 
involving the social partners. Also, the Government made statutory changes to the terms and 
conditions of employment agreed by the social partners. The non-democratic procedures used 
to alter industrial relations resemble the authoritarian rule in place before 1989. Evidence 
points to a large degree of continuity in terms of strong state intervention in industrial 
relations. This institutional arrangement seems to be a type of authoritarian neo-liberalism 
(Trif, 2013), as change in industrial relations is driven by an interventionist state in the field 
of wage setting that, at the same time, is pushing forward labour market deregulation and 
dismantling workers’ rights. Similar to other countries severely affected by the crisis, the 
Romanian Government managed to introduce those neo-liberal policies with the strong 
support of the Troika. 
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Appendix 
Key changes in fundamental unions’ rights after the adoption of the Social Dialogue Act 
(SDA) 
  Before SDA 
(until 2011) 
Key changes after the adoption of SDA 
(since 2011) 
C
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e 
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a
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g
 
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
le
v
el
 
Unions negotiated annually 
national collective agreements 
(CAs) at cross-sectoral level, 
which covered all employees. 
Unions are not allowed to negotiate cross-
sectoral CAs. 
S
ec
to
ra
l 
le
v
el
 
- 20 sectors (out of 32) 
were covered by CAs in 
2011. 
 
 
- There was statutory 
extension of CAs. 
- Unions unable to negotiate new sectoral 
CAs in the private sector until March 
2014. 
 
- CAs can be extended only if the 
members of employers’ associations that 
signed the agreement employ more than 
50 percent of the labour force in the 
sector. 
C
o
m
p
a
n
y
 l
ev
el
 
- Unions were considered 
representative if their density 
was  ≥33 percent. 
 
- Shop stewards could take up 
to five days of paid leave to 
deal with union issues. 
- Union are representative if their density is 
≥51 percent. 
=>Unions with less than 50 percent 
density do not have the right to 
conclude CAs. 
 
 
-   Shop stewards can take up to five days of 
unpaid leave to deal with union issues. 
F
re
ed
o
m
 o
f 
a
ss
o
ci
a
ti
o
n
 
- Minimum of 15 
employees working in the 
same profession could 
form a union. 
 
- Minimum of 15 workers from the same 
company is required to form a union. 
=> Unions cannot organise workers 
in over 90 percent of Romanian 
companies, which have less than 15 
employees (Barbuceanu, 2012). 
In
d
u
st
ri
a
l 
a
ct
io
n
 
- No obligatory 
conciliation before strikes. 
- Unions were allowed to 
organise industrial action 
to enforce the 
implementation of CAs.  
- Obligatory conciliation before strike 
action.  
 
- Workers are not allowed to go on strike 
if 
o CAs’ provisions are not 
implemented  
o The solution to the conflict 
requires legal changes. 
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i Monitorul Oficial nr. 746/2010 - M. Of. 746 / 9 noiembrie 2010, Decizia nr. 1276 din 12 octombrie 2010 
referitoare la exceptia de neconstitutionalitate a dispozitiilor art.35 alin.(1) tezafinala din Legeasindicatelor 
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 There was a decline from 20 sectoral collective agreements in 2010 to seven in 2013.  
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